After 20 years, UN sanctions on Iraq finally have come to an official end. Let’s consider their tragic legacy.
First, the good news:
The sanctions were successful in restraining Iraq’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. They cut off the supply of vital nuclear-related materials. An official report of the British Foreign Office in September 2002 noted that sanctions “were hindering the impact of crucial potential nuclear-weapons applications” and “that Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon” as long as sanctions were in place.
Sanctions also prevented Saddam Hussein from rebuilding his war machine after the 1991 war. According to State Department figures, Iraqi military spending dropped from more than $22 billion in 1990, to an average of little more $1 billion annually through the 1990s. Iraq’s previously huge volume of military imports slowed to a trickle.
Sanctions pressured the Hussein regime to accept UN weapons inspections, which achieved unacknowledged success in eliminating Iraq’s nuclear and other weapons programs. UN diplomats credited the sanctions with helping to overcome Baghdad’s frequent attempts to obstruct the inspections.
The sanctions did not make Saddam Hussein less truculent or more cooperative, but they hampered his ability to threaten his neighbors and develop nuclear weapons.
Now, the bad news: