The Iran Nuclear Deal: Defending Success

Hats off to Joe Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund, for his brilliant take down of David Samuels’ recent New York Times Magazine article and attack against the Iran nuclear deal.  Cirincione counters Samuels’ distortions about the negotiated agreement and shows the importance of defending it against those who would tear it up.

Samuels’ article is mostly about Ben Rhodes, the influential speech writer and communications guru in the National Security Council who has helped to shape President Obama’s thinking on foreign policy over the past seven years. Rhodes also played an important role in winning support for the Iran deal. When the official implementation process began earlier this year many of us hailed the agreement as a triumph of diplomacy over war.

Not Samuels. He portrays it as a White House propaganda coup engineered by Rhodes and a step toward U.S. disengagement from the Middle East. As Cirincione writes, the Samuels critique is “utter nonsense.”

So far the agreement has produced positive benefits. Iran has removed two-thirds of its uranium enrichment capacity, shipped almost all of its enriched uranium fuel out of the country, completely dismantled its plutonium production reactor, and accepted “an airtight inspection regime tougher than any ever negotiated.” In return the U.S. and the European Union have lifted nuclear-related sanctions. As long as the deal remains in force and implementation continues, Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon.

The expectation of this outcome is why hundreds of retired generals and admirals, former diplomats, nonproliferation experts, scientists and religious leaders endorsed the Iran deal. Several Israeli former military and intelligence leaders and former U.S. ambassadors to Israel also supported the agreement.

The Ploughshares Fund, the Iran Project, the National Iranian American Council, the Arms Control Association, the Win Without War coalition and many other progressive foreign policy groups in the U.S. mounted substantial educational and advocacy efforts in support of the agreement.

The debate generated by the Samuels article reminds us that in the policy world we must not only fight to achieve victories but also work to defend those victories against counterattack. Right wing political forces in Israel and the U.S. have not abandoned their opposition to the Iran deal. They are continuing to mobilize against it. The opponents of diplomacy want to turn back the clock toward a policy of greater confrontation with Iran.

Diplomacy worked in limiting Iran’s nuclear program. That important accomplishment needs to be understood and defended, so that diplomacy can be applied again in other settings as a viable alternative to war.

Saudi Arabia and an Iran Nuclear Deal

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is not the only one worried about a possible U.S. nuclear deal with Iran. The leaders of Saudi Arabia are also concerned.  They fear that if Washington reaches an accommodation with Tehran on its nuclear program, the two countries will begin to cooperate on other issues—including Syria, the fight against ISIS, and Afghanistan—which would give Iran greater influence in the region.

The U.S. is already working in parallel with Iran in Syria and Iraq, although officials in Washington deny any direct coordination. The two sides have similar interests in opposing the rise of ISIS. Both want to see an end to the civil war in Syria and are concerned about the spreading violence and instability in Iraq. The two countries also share the goal of attempting to stabilize Afghanistan and reduce Taliban influence.

The United States especially needs Iran’s help in Iraq and Syria. Tehran has sufficient leverage in Baghdad and Syria to encourage the political concessions and diplomatic compromises that will be needed to reduce the appeal of ISIS and stem the tide of political instability and war in the region. The U.S. knows this, which is undoubtedly one of the reasons the Obama administration is so intent on finding a solution to the nuclear standoff, which would pave the way for engaging Iran on other issues.

If Tehran and Washington reach an accommodation on the nuclear issue, Iran will begin to emerge from its political and diplomatic isolation. Sanctions will ease and new economic development opportunities will emerge. Iran will become a major regional player.

This is exactly what worries the Saudis. They do not want to see the rise of Iranian influence. Saudi leaders are concerned about Iranian support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen and the possibility of Iranian support for their own restless Shia communities. Saudi Arabia views Iran as its principal rival for primacy in the Gulf region, and as the source of revolutionary Shiite Islam which competes with Riyadh’s ultraconservative Sunni Wahhabism.

The Saudis are also very worried about ISIS, however. They are participating in the U.S.-led campaign of air strikes against ISIS, and they are bolstering their northern border against possible ISIS incursions.

The irony is that in the fight against ISIS Saudi Arabia needs Iran, just as the U.S. does. Through its support for the Shiite militias in Iraq, Iran is one of the major bulwarks against ISIS. From an objective security perspective, Saudi Arabia should be cooperating with Iran to deter and push back ISIS.

Saudi Arabia has deep geopolitical and ideological differences with Iran that prevent it from considering such cooperation, but conditions could change if the outcome of the nuclear negotiations is successful (still very uncertain) and the threat from ISIS intensifies. If their longtime allies in Washington begin to work alongside Iran, Saudi leaders may begin to do the same. Much would have to change for this to happen, but the result could be a united front against ISIS and greater security in the region.

Questions for U.S. Strategy Against ISIS

As President Obama unveils his strategy against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, critical questions remain unanswered:

  • Why is the U.S. strategy focused so extensively on military measures when the President himself has stated, and many experts agree, that overcoming the threat posed by ISIS is fundamentally a political problem that will require political solutions?
  • Why do we think limited military efforts will succeed now when more robust military measures over the past decade were unable to bring stability and security to Iraq? When will we learn, as former Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in 2008, that “we cannot kill or capture our way to victory” in the fight against terrorism and insurgency?
  • Why does the President says there will be no ‘boots on the ground’ when he has already sent hundreds of U.S. military advisers to Iraq? How will we avoid the slippery slope of deeper military involvement if American advisers are killed or kidnapped?
  • How do we ensure that the weapons we provide to local militias in Iraq and Syria are not used against us or our allies in the region? News reports indicate that some of the weapons recently recovered from ISIS fighters in Iraq were made in the U.S.
  • How is it possible to fight against the enemies of the Assad regime in Syria without helping that regime?

Pope Francis’ Advice for President Obama

In his statement yesterday on the conflict in northern Iraq Pope Francis helped to clarify the moral basis for military action against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and also defined its limits. President Obama should take some pointers.

In cases where there is unjust aggression, said the Pope, a moral duty exists to stop the aggressor. This is not an endorsement of war but a reiteration of the ‘just cause’ criterion for when limited military force may be permissible. It is a statement of the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle endorsed by human rights groups and adopted by the United Nations and most countries.

When innocent populations face imminent threat of attack, it is morally justified to take action to stop the killing. No nation alone should decide how to respond, the Pope emphasized. The determination of whether aggression has occurred and what should be done to stop it is up to the United Nations. The responsibility to judge and act belongs to the international community, not an individual country. The pontiff also emphasized that the imperative to protect does not mean bombing or making war.

President Obama on the other hand clings to the threadbare argument that U.S. bombing and drone strikes in the region are necessary to protect American military advisers based hundreds of miles away in Baghdad. The administration is claiming open-ended authority to launch military strikes and seems to be planning a protracted military campaign to counter ISIS.

No one objects to preventing extremists from murdering civilians and taking over cities and towns, but President Obama should follow Pope Francis’ advice and bring this issue to the UN Security Council. Let’s work with other nations to develop a comprehensive strategy for countering ISIS and cutting off its sources of recruits, weapons and money.  If further military action is deemed necessary, it should be multilateral not unilateral.

Needed: An International Strategy in Iraq

I’ve been asked by Jim Wallis and the team at Sojourners for my thoughts on how to respond to the current humanitarian and security crisis in Iraq.

I believe the United States should work through the United Nations to develop a coherent humanitarian, political and military strategy for addressing the needs of persecuted minority communities and countering the security threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS.

Unilateral U.S. military action is unsustainable and unwise over the long run. If further security measures are needed to protect civilians from ISIS, they should be multilateral, not unilateral.

Read my comments here, posted in today’s God’s Politics blog.

Engage the UN to Counter the ISIL Terrorist Threat

The violent extremists of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have seized major cities and swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq and are seeking to create a caliphate over the entire Muslim world. The group poses a threat not only to the region but to global security. The battle-hardened forces of ISIL include hundreds of fighters from Europe and Chechnya and even some from the United States. Some of these fighters will likely take their warped ideology and violent skills with them when they return home.

Why then, in the face of this clear and present danger to global security, has the United States not joined with other countries in bringing this matter to the UN Security Council? Isn’t that why the UN was created, to mobilize cooperative action in response to international security threats? The failure to work through the UN diminishes the prospects for building an effective international coalition against ISIL. It reduces the repertroire of potential responses to the crisis and contributes to the atrophy of the UN and of multilateralism in general.

Thirteen years ago, in response to the 9/11 attacks, the response was very different. The Security Council met immediately and adopted a wide range of measures to harness international action against al-Qaeda. Most significant was Security Council Resolution 1373, which required every country to freeze the financial assets of al-Qaeda terrorists and their supporters, deny them travel or safe haven, prevent terrorist recruitment and weapons supply, and cooperate with other countries in information sharing and criminal prosecution. In its response to 9/11, the Council also expanded existing sanctions on al-Qaeda and the Taliban, created new bodies to monitor and assist compliance with counterterrorism measures, and established a wide range of counterterrorism programs that have helped, along with U.S. military pressures, to diminish the global threat from al-Qaeda.

Contrast that robust response to the meager efforts of today. The Security Council Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee recently added names of ISIL leaders to its existing sanctions list, but it has not taken effective action to ensure compliance with those measures. Although ISIL is mercilessly pursuing its aim of creating a terrorist quasi-state in Iraq and Syria, the Council has not met to address the growing threat. It has not adopted new measures to suppress ISIL and cut off its supply of money and recruits. It has not discussed needed diplomatic efforts to encourage more inclusive political governance in Iraq and Syria.

It’s time to mount a vigorous global response commensurate with the magnitude of the threat. Here are some of the diplomatic and political steps the United States and other states might consider through the UN:

  • Impose an arms embargo along with rigorous financial and travel sanctions against the leaders of ISIL and their supporters and prohibit any form of assistance for the organization and its operations. Create a special sanctions committee and panel of experts to facilitate and monitor compliance and to recommend further measures to isolate and suppress the organization.
  • Join with neighboring states in convening an international conference for Iraq, to assess the current security and political challenges facing the country and the region and to develop appropriate diplomatic, political, and if necessary security responses. Work with the government of Iraq to implement the recommended responses.
  • Re-convene the Geneva diplomatic process on Syria, with the full participation of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other neighboring states, to renew the search for a negotiated solution to the Syrian civil war and enhanced security for neighboring states.

The proposed actions are no panacea for peace. UN engagement will not magically resolve the deep crises afflicting Iraq, Syria and the region. More concerted multilateral action can help, however, and at a minimum can heighten global involvement and help to broaden the global alliance against ISIL.

Alternative Policy Options for Iraq and Syria

For those who claim that military action is the only response to the extremist threat in Iraq and the region, here are some alternative policy options:

  • Engage with Iran in urging the Maliki regime to adopt more inclusive and equitable power sharing arrangements with the Sunni community. Demand that the regime fulfill pledges made to integrate Sunni leaders into positions of government authority.
  • Make clear to the Maliki government that U.S. military and economic support for Iraq will diminish if the Baghdad government refuses to adopt more inclusive and equitable power sharing arrangements with the Sunni community.
  • Bring the threat posed by ISIS/ISIL to the UN Security Council and seek a united global response that identifies the group as an international terrorist threat to peace and security. Urge the Security Council to impose sanctions and other mandatory international actions to isolate and suppress the extremist group through multilateral action.
  • Work with Iran and other states in the region to return to the Geneva negotiating process that seeks a negotiated end to the civil war in Syria.
  • Continue to provide maximum humanitarian assistance to the millions of refugees who have fled the war in Syria and the spreading conflict in Iraq.

Diplomacy Not More Arms Needed in Iraq and Syria

The capture of Mosul by militant Sunni extremist groups is a body blow to the Shia-dominated government of Iraq and marks a significant escalation of the sectarian war that is tearing apart the region. The Iraqi Army, which the United States created as an intended bulwark of security, has crumbled in the face of attacks by the increasingly powerful forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), with U.S. weapons and equipment sent to bolster the Iraqi Army now falling into extremist hands.

In the United States, some on the right have used the occasion to criticize the Obama administration for not doing enough to bolster the Baghdad government and for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011 (overlooking the fact that the President was elected on a pledge to do precisely that). On the left, critics blame the Bush administration’s 2003 U.S. invasion and emphasize its unintended consequences.

Debates about the past are important but do not address the problem of what can be done now to stem the spread of violence and instability. The United States and other external actors have very few options. Here are some considerations to keep in mind as the debate unfolds.

  • This is a large-scale regional war pitting Sunni and Shia political forces. It is centered in Syria and Iraq but also involves Lebanon and is supported by competing Saudi and Iranian interests. Any lasting solution has to be regional in nature and must address the political interests of all the major factions in an equitable and inclusive manner.
  • Some in Washington have reacted to the crisis by calling on President Obama to send even more arms and military equipment to Iraq, but Baghdad’s sectarian Shia-dominated forces are part of the problem not the solution. Pouring arms into the spreading cauldron of war risks exacerbating the crisis in Iraq.
  • Attempts by the U.S. or other major powers to intervene unilaterally or to impose external military solutions will likely backfire and inflame militant extremism. Security solutions will need to be multilateral in the context of negotiated political settlements.
  • This crisis increasingly poses threats to global security and requires a multilateral diplomatic response. The United States should work through the United Nations (and the Arab League if possible) to propose and support a major global diplomatic initiative. This will require returning to the Geneva process of attempting to find a political solution in Syria, but this time with Iran directly involved and the agenda broadened to include political alternatives in Iraq.

The chances of achieving diplomatic success are slim, but doing nothing is not a realistic option. A fully inclusive international diplomatic process should be attempted and is urgently needed now, before the fires of war and militancy spread further in the region.

Iran should be at the table

As I wrote the other day for the Christian Science Monitor, the decision to exclude Iran from the Montreux talks is a huge diplomatic mistake.

Tehran’s help could be crucial in forging a coordinated diplomatic strategy for resolving the crisis in Syria and enhancing regional security. As a major backer of the current regime, Iran has enormous potential leverage in Damascus.

Iran’s goal in neighboring Syria is to have a regime that is friendly to its interests and that protects the Alewite community. But this does not mean Iranian officials are wedded to the discredited Assad regime. They might be willing to consider an alternative arrangement if it addresses their needs.

It was unwise for the U.S. to insist that Iran publicly commit to replacing Assad before the talks begin. Insisting on preconditions for negotiations is not the way to successful diplomacy.

Tehran shares Washington’s goal of ending a war that is causing widespread instability and violence in the region. Iran also shares the goal of ending the growing threat of Al Qaida-based militancy in Syria.

By inviting Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia to the negotiations but excluding Shia-majority Iran the United States is taking sides in a regional ethnic power struggle. This could exacerbate the deepening Sunni-Shia divide and further undermine security in the region.

Washington would do better to adopt a more even-handed strategy that seeks to balance differing interests and works toward more inclusive power sharing in Syria and across the region.

Give Diplomacy a Chance

The response to the Iranian nuclear deal in the United States has been surreal. The media is talking about the risks of the deal, but as I point out in my blog today for Sojourners, the terms of the agreement favor the U.S.

Under the terms of the deal Iran agrees to:

  • freeze its stockpile of low enriched uranium and halt the installation and operation of additional centrifuges;
  • halt enrichment to higher levels and render its existing supplies of higher enriched uranium unsuitable for further enrichment; and
  • halt the development of its heavy water reactor at Arak.

Verification and monitoring of the Iran nuclear program will increase significantly. The sanctions relief offered to Iran is temporary and can be reversed if Tehran reneges on any part of the deal.

The agreement limits Iran’s nuclear program and increases its transparency. From a U.S. perspective, what’s not to like?

Let’s contact our Senators and demand that they give diplomacy a chance. Urge them to oppose any further sanctions as long as Iran complies with the agreement.